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Summary  
Several studies have shown that when people are asked to estimate the probabilities 
for a set of exclusive and exhaustive events they often produce probabilities that add up to 
more than 1 or 100% (Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 1974b, 1983), thus violating the 
additivity principle stated by formal probability theory. The present dissertation aims to 
further investigate the determining factors of additivity neglect and the underlying cognitive 
processes.  
Paper I - The aim of Paper I was to investigate several determinants of additivity 
neglect. We wanted to investigate the notion that this bias is related to people’s lack of 
mathematical skills, by giving participants a numeracy test. We were also interested in 
examining how people understand and predict disjunctive sets of outcomes, where the total 
ought to sum to more than 100%. Lastly, several pilot studies had suggested that answering 
format affected people’s additivity, where a written format (writing estimates in an empty 
slot next to each outcome in the set) seemed to prompt more additive responses than 
estimates given on a scale format (circling numbers on 0-100% horizontal rating scales for 
each outcome in the set).  
The overall results showed that numeracy (Experiments 1 and 3) was positively 
related to additive responses. In addition, varying the presentation of the Numeracy scale 
(before vs. after the estimation tasks), revealed that answering the Numeracy test prior to 
the probability tasks “primed” participants (mainly those with high numeracy) to answer 
according to mathematical principles. It is thus not sufficient to have high numeracy; one 
must also be reminded that mathematical rules apply. We also found a clear tendency for 
estimates given in the written format to be lower than estimates in scale format 
(Experiments 2, 3 and 4). The written format in the single outcome conditions also yielded 
more additive responses.  Lastly, participants estimates of disjunctive probabilities were, in 
both formats, quite close to the estimates of single outcomes (Experiment 1 and 2), and the 
probability of winning was judged to be higher than the probability of becoming second 
best (Experiment 2 and 3). The probability estimates for the disjunctive outcome tasks were 
unrelated to participants’ numeracy and the mathematical mindset priming.  
Paper II – The aim of Paper II was to further investigate the difference in answering 
format found in Paper I, by using a process measure in the form of eye-tracking. Monitoring 
eye movements provides information about the decision process by registering what 
participants are looking at (fixations), repeated inspections of the same material (revisits), 
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and cognitive load (fixation durations). We predicted that fixations, fixation durations, and 
revisits would differ based on the two answering formats, due to participants assigning 
probabilities one by one, in a case-based manner, in the Scale format, or in a compensatory 
manner, in the Self-generated format.  
The results showed that participants in the Self-generated condition had more 
fixations, and on average almost twice as many revisits between the alternatives compared 
to the Scale condition, indicating more comparisons between the alternatives in the set in 
the Self-generated condition. We also expected to find that the participants in the Self-
generated condition had longer fixation durations than participants in the Scale condition, 
however, this was not the case. Overall, the results from Paper II indicate that the Scale 
format might prompt a selective evaluation of the alternatives, and thereby discourage 
comparisons between alternatives. The Self-generated estimates facilitate a class-based 
approach and make people engage in more comprehensive comparisons.  
Paper III – The aim of Paper III was to compare additivity neglect to another type 
of bias that commonly occurs in referent-dependent judgments, namely the nonselective 
superiority bias. The nonselective superiority bias (NSSB) is the consistent evaluation of 
individual members of a positive set of items (e.g., five good movies) as superior to most 
other members in the set (Giladi & Klar, 2002). Both biases violate basic formal constraints, 
as a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as better than the group mean (NSSB), 
and are thus “unbalanced”; while the probabilities of a set of exhaustive events cannot add 
up to more than 100% (additivity neglect), and are thus non-additive.  
Participants in three experiments were asked to give both probability estimates and 
comparative judgments in separate tasks. The results from all experiments indicated several 
similarities between the nonselective superiority bias and additivity neglect. Both biases 
seem to be about equally widespread, as a majority of participants´ probability sums far 
exceeded 100%, and mean ratings were significantly greater than zero (normative mean for 
items in a set), even when presented with the full set of alternatives. The two biases were 
also related, as participants who gave additive probability estimates gave more balanced 
distributions of ratings to the NSSB tasks. However, NSSB seems to be more robust, in the 
sense that the degree of bias could not be reduced by changing the answering format to a 
Self-generated format.  
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Introduction 
Our lives are fraught with uncertainty:  what will happen to the key policy rate? 
Which political party will win the next election? Which football team will win the next 
world cup? Which summer month will have the highest number of sunny days? Why isn’t 
my car starting? Moreover, all of these uncertain events have more than one possible 
outcome, but the different outcomes are often not equally likely. For example: at the present 
time, the Norwegian Bank’s key policy rate is set at 1.25%. In the future it can decrease 
(<1.25%), stay the same (1.25%), increase by a little (1.30% - 1.60%), or increase with a lot 
(>1.60%). When trying to decide your price range for purchasing a new apartment, these 
possible outcomes will affect your mortgage differently. We thus need to consider the 
chances of these future outcomes before we make our decision. However, when people are 
asked to estimate the probabilities for a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes, 
they often produce probabilities that add up to more than 100% (or p > 1) (Robinson & 
Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 1974b, 1983), thus violating the additivity principle stated by formal 
probability theory. We call judgments involving the relative standing of several candidate 
events referent-dependent judgments, and the particular error in people’s judgment 
additivity neglect. 
The present work investigates why people fail to adhere to the principle of additivity 
in three papers. In Paper I we examined the role of numeracy in judgments of both single 
outcome events and disjunctive outcome events, and the effect of reminding participants 
that mathematical rules apply to the probability tasks. We found evidence of numeracy 
being related to additive responses in the single outcome events, but not in the disjunctive 
outcome events. Further, giving participants the numeracy test prior to the probability tasks 
led to more additive responses, particularly for the more numerate participants. Paper I also 
revealed that different answering formats affect additivity neglect, where writing the 
probabilities in empty slots next to the alternatives (Self-generated format) lead to more 
additive responses than circling numbers on a scale (Scale format). In Paper II we further 
investigated the difference in answering formats and the claim of case-based processing by 
monitoring participants eye-movements whilst making their judgments. The results revealed 
that the Self-generated format encourages a more comparative processing thus leading to 
more additive responses. As referent-dependent judgments need not only be judgments of 
probabilities, Paper III compared additivity neglect to another bias that can arise in referent-
dependent judgments, namely the nonselective superiority bias (NSSB). This bias is the 
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systematic evaluation of individual members of a positive set of items (e.g., five desirable 
vacation destinations) as superior to most other members in the set (Giladi & Klar, 2002), 
thus yielding an “unbalanced” set of judgments, as a set of attractive candidates cannot all 
be rated as better than the group mean. The results show that the same participants often 
display both biases. In addition, verbal reports demonstrated that people fail to consider 
normative constraints due to considering alternatives one-by-one (case-based), or because 
the constraints would lead to judgments not representing their true beliefs. 
In the following, I will first briefly introduce referent-dependent judgments. As 
additivity neglect can be characterized as a type of subadditive judgment, I will explain 
these two related concepts, the differences in how they are investigated, before I review 
specific findings related to additivity neglect. Next, some relevant theoretical perspectives 
will be introduced. Firstly I will discuss support theory and its shortcomings in explaining 
additivity neglect. Subsequently, I will introduce important terms such as numeracy, case-
based processing, and the nonselective superiority bias. The next part will summarize the 
results from the three papers included in the dissertation, followed by a discussion of 
methodological considerations. Lastly, the General Discussion will discuss possible 
explanations, theoretical implications and future directions of the present work. 
Referent-dependent judgments 
A judgment is an assessment or evaluation of something or someone, and can be 
rankings, estimates, predictions, ratings, categorizations, etc. (e.g., Hardman, 2009). 
Normatively speaking, one could argue that all judgments are referent-dependent 
(Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998), in the sense that they presuppose 
comparisons with a standard, a default value, or with non-focal alternative objects or 
outcomes. This is also the case with probability judgments. Firstly, the probability of an 
event occurring has at least one counterpart, which is the event not occurring. Thus, if we 
are considering the chance of the key policy rate increasing next year, we should also 
consider the chances of the key policy rate not increasing. Secondly, there will often be 
more than one counterpart, as demonstrated above. In general, any type of judgment that 
requires dividing a fixed pie into separate pieces can be considered a referent-dependent 
judgment (Windschitl, Conybeare, & Krizan, 2008; Windschitl, Rose, Stalkfleet, & Smith, 
2008). In other words, such judgments not only require people to consider the target (the 
outcome in focus), but also the referents (the other possible outcomes in the set).  
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A frequent error in referent-dependent judgments is inaccurate judgments of 
numerical probabilities. There are two ways in which numerical probability judgments can 
be wrong: they can be inaccurate according to a correspondence criterion, or according to a 
coherence criterion (Carlson & Yates, 1989; Winman, Juslin, Lindskog, Nilsson, & Kerimi, 
2014). The correspondence criterion is satisfied when a person’s judgments attain observed 
accuracy, like for example the relative frequency of an event observed in the real world; the 
coherence criterion is achieved when a person’s judgments are consistent compared to 
logical, mathematical, or statistical rules, such as the principle of additivity.  
Numerous studies have shown that people’s judgments can be normatively incorrect, 
and often systematically deviate from what is predicted by probability and utility theory, 
such as conjunction and disjunction fallacies (Carlson & Yates, 1989; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983) and base-rate neglect (Bar-Hillel, 1980; Barbey & Sloman, 2007; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). The systematic deviation from the norm is important; if the 
errors in judgments were random they would cancel each other out. However, as judgments 
are systematically biased towards either overestimations or underestimations, most judges 
will make the same mistake. Needless to say, this can be problematic.  
Subadditivity and Additivity neglect 
Additivity neglect is a type of subadditive judgment, and subadditivity is often 
defined as “the probability of the whole is judged to be less than that of the sum of its parts” 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2010, pp. 174). Although both the name and the definition of 
subadditivity seems to imply that “the whole” is underestimated it would be more correct to 
say that the individual parts are overestimated (Koehler, 2000). Subadditivity is a robust 
finding that has been demonstrated in many studies, using both students and experts as 
participants, such as experienced physicians (Redelmeier, Koehler, Liberman, & Tversky, 
1995), lawyers (Fox & Birke, 2002), chess players (Nordbye & Teigen, 2014), basketball 
fans (Fox, 1999), rescue workers (Hill, 2012), and options traders (Fox, Rogers, & Tversky, 
1996). Subadditivity research has been conducted using several different designs, focusing 
on violations of mainly two different mathematical norms, namely non-extensionality and 
non-additivity. It is beyond the present dissertation to make claims to whether or not these 
types of subadditivity are variants of the same phenomenon or if they are separate biases 
with different underlying cognitive processes. Nonetheless, one way of organizing the 
literature is according to which normative rules are being violated and the differences in 
experimental setup.  
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The first way of investigating subadditive judgments is as systematic 
overestimations of all (or most) specified targets, and is sometimes referred to as generic 
subadditivity (e.g., Fox & Birke, 2002). Such studies often use a between-subject design, 
where participants receive one alternative belonging to an exhaustive set of outcomes, but 
are not asked to give estimations for the whole set (Fox & Birke, 2002; Redelmeier et al., 
1995). The estimates given across the conditions are then added up, and if these estimates 
exceed 100%, participant’s judgments are seen as subadditive. An example of this paradigm 
is found in Redelmeier et al. (1995). In this study four groups of physicians were asked to 
estimate one of four prognoses (dying during admission; surviving the admission, but dying 
within one year; living for one year, but less than ten years; and surviving for more than ten 
years) for a 67 years old patient with acute myocardial infarction. When the physicians’ 
estimates in each condition were added up, the probabilities for all the patient’s prognoses 
reached 164% rather than 100%, as required by the additivity principle. However, each 
participant can be said to only being faulted with an overestimation of his or hers specific 
target, akin to a focusing illusion (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006; 
Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). Only 
when adding participants’ estimates does the violation of additivity become transparent. 
The second way of studying subadditive judgments is as violations of the 
mathematical principle of extensionality, which states that events with the same extension 
must be assigned the same probability. This type of subadditivity is sometimes called 
implicit subadditivity (e.g., Fox & Birke, 2002; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997). Research 
investigating violations of extensionality often compare judgments of packed versus 
unpacked hypotheses.  A packed hypothesis will contain a nested set of alternatives and ask 
for a judgment of for example, “dying of unnatural causes”. The unpacked hypothesis will 
ask for individual judgments of all (or some) alternatives belonging to the packed event, 
like for example, being murdered, dying in a car accident, drowning, etc. An unpacked 
hypothesis thus contains an explicit subset of some, or all, alternatives belonging to the 
uncertain event, whereas the packed hypothesis will contain a nested set of unspecified 
alternatives. In order to not violate extensionality, the probability of a packed hypothesis 
should be equal to or greater than the sum of an unpacked one. However, many studies have 
demonstrated that people frequently overestimate the probability of unpacked sets, 
rendering probability estimates far exceeding that of the packed set (Fox & Birke, 2002; 
Fox & Clemen, 2005; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). An 
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example of an early such study is the fault tree experiment by Fischhoff, Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein (1978). A fault tree is a visual organization of possible sources of a problem, in 
this case, reasons why a car would not start. Participants were not given the same fault trees, 
with the expectation that participants would detect the missing alternatives on their trees. 
However, the results showed that participants were rather insensitive to the alternatives left 
out of their fault tree, as their judged probabilities for the outcomes that were packed (i.e., 
probable alternatives “missing” from the fault tree) were small. Two important notes should 
be made about this type of studies: Firstly, they mostly use a between-subjects design, 
where participants either judge the packed set of outcomes or the unpacked set of outcomes 
(for an exception see Hill, 2012). Secondly, participants may be reminded to make sure their 
estimates added to 100%, as adherence to the principle of additivity for an exhaustive set is 
not necessarily the focus of such studies.  
This leads to the third way of studying study subadditive judgments, namely as 
violations of the principle of additivity, using a within-subjects design and giving 
participants the full set of outcomes. However, despite such studies using a within-subjects 
design, presentation of the outcomes is often either sequential or includes distractor items, 
making it difficult for participants to parse out which outcomes belong together in a set 
(e.g., Dougherty & Hunter, 2003; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997). 
For example, a study asking participants to judge the winning probabilities of eight teams in 
the NBA basketball quarterfinals, presented the outcomes in lists containing both single and 
disjunctive outcomes, 14 outcomes in total (Fox & Tversky, 1998). Such designs often 
originate from the assumption that presenting all alternatives together will make the 
additivity requirement transparent and thus eliminate the bias (Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 
1997; Macchi, Osherson, & Krantz, 1999). However, some early studies by Teigen (1974a, 
1974b, 1983, 1988) and Robinson/Van Wallendael and Hastie (1985; 1990) demonstrated 
that people often produce probability sums exceeding 100%, even in a within-subjects 
design. Given that participants have problems remaining within the 100% limit when the 
outcomes are presented together as an exhaustive set, it is perhaps not surprising that 
participants fail to do so in studies using a more complex layout of the alternatives.  
In the present studies all the alternatives are presented on the same page (except 
Experiment 4, Paper I), asking participants to give estimates for each outcome. We have 
called this type of global subadditivity additivity neglect, as the term more aptly describes 
the bias (Riege & Teigen, 2013). For example, even though only one team can win the 
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World Cup, people’s judgments of the individual team’s chances often sum up to more than 
100%, thus neglecting the principle of additivity.  
Additivity neglect 
Within psychology, non-additive probability judgments was originally documented 
by Teigen (1974a, 1974b), and earlier studies of subjective probability estimates assumed 
that people would adhere to the rule, instructing people to make sure their estimates added 
up to 1 or 100% (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Peterson, Ducharme, & Edwards, 1968) . 
However, Teigen (1974b) showed that when allowing participants to give “unrestricted” 
estimates they frequently violate the principle of additivity. People can violate the additivity 
axiom in two ways, they can overestimate the total probabilities, or they can underestimate 
the total probabilities which is often referred to as superadditivity (e.g., Sloman, 
Rottenstreich, Wisniewski, Hadjichristidis, & Fox, 2004). Superadditivity are probabilities 
that sum to less than 100%. Such systematic underestimations are rare, but can occur when 
events are atypical (Sloman et al., 2004), unpacked in great detail (Redden & Frederick, 
2011), or outside participants field of knowledge (Macchi et al., 1999). The present work 
concerns judgments that add to more than 100%. 
Overall, studies investigating additivity neglect have shown that the sum of 
participants’ probability estimates increase with the number of alternative outcomes even 
when each set is exhaustive (Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 1983). When participants 
are given two outcomes, most estimates will be additive (Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 
1983; Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Van Wallendael, 1989; Van Wallendael & Hastie, 1990, 
for an exception see McKenzie, 1999). Increasing the number of alternatives leads to an 
increase in probabilities. For example, Teigen (1983, Exp.II) showed that by increasing the 
number of outcomes to four; seven; and ten alternatives, across three tasks, increased 
participants means from 130.1% for four alternatives, 190.9% for seven alternatives, to 
227.4% for ten alternatives. Across the three tasks, only 8.8% of the participants 
consistently gave estimates adding to 100%.  Moreover, in Experiment IV, the experimenter 
added two new alternatives to the set of outcomes during the data collection; yet only 16% 
reduced their prior estimates, even when the experimenter explicitly allowed them to 
change their original estimates. Most participants thought the two new outcomes had 
roughly the same chances as the first four. This demonstrates another important finding, 
specifically, that participants seem to lack an understanding of the complementarity of the 
outcomes. Adding two new, and apparently plausible, alternatives to the set should have 
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resulted in a downward adjustment of the judged chances of first four alternatives. However, 
very few changed their original estimates. In a similar study, participants playing an 
experimental version of a murder mystery game, were asked to revise the estimates of all 
the suspects for each new clue they were given. Participants rarely, or insufficiently, revised 
their estimates for the referent suspects when changing the estimate of a focal suspect in 
light of new evidence (Robinson & Hastie, 1985). This meant that evidence implying a 
suspect’s guilt was treated as if it had no bearing on the guilt of the other suspects. Thus, 
when one suspect’s probability increased, the others did not decrease. Further, when one 
suspect was eliminated by a strong “innocent” clue, the other suspects’ probabilities did not 
increase. One explanation for additivity neglect has therefore been that people either fail to 
use their mathematical skills when making probabilistic judgments of uncertain events, or 
that they altogether lack the mathematical skills necessary to give normative responses 
(Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 1983). Another explanation is that the bias occurs due to 
a case-based approach to the probability judgments, where people consider one alternative 
at the time, thus failing to take the complementarity of the alternatives into account 
(Sanbonmatsu, Posavac, & Stasney, 1997; Teigen & Brun, 2011). 
 
Theoretical background 
Support theory 
The broadest theoretical account of subadditivity, and thus additivity neglect, is 
support theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Support theory is a descriptive account of 
subjective probabilities, developed to account for biases in numeric probability judgments, 
and one of the foundations is subadditive judgments. The theory is mainly concerned with 
explaining why people violate the extensionality principle (implicit subadditivity), and 
suggests that the failure to adhere to the axiom of extensionality has two main sources. The 
first is limitations of memory. People cannot be expected to recall or list all possible subsets 
of a category/event, although they will be able to recognize them when explicitly reminded. 
An explicit description might therefore remind people of relevant cases, despite not being 
able to list them. The second reason for non-extensionality is that different descriptions of 
the same event might direct people’s attention to different aspects of the outcome and thus 
affect the saliency of the descriptions. Support theory states that probability estimates are 
based on descriptions of events, which within the support theory framework is called 
hypotheses, as opposed to the actual events (Fox & Birke, 2002; Tversky & Koehler, 1994). 
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Support theory further suggests that a probability estimate will depend on the perceived 
evidence, or support, for the focal hypothesis, relative to the support for the referent 
hypotheses (Idson, Krantz, Osherson, & Bonini, 2001; Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; 
Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Support theory thus suggests that participants’ estimates are 
formed based on the perceived balance between supporting vs. non-supporting evidence. 
This might be done using actual statistical information or by mental shortcuts such as the 
availability or representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It is possible that 
participants use heuristics such as representativeness or availability when making their 
estimations, as both heuristics are said to substitute a difficult question (“what are the 
chances of the next Nobel Peace Prize laureate being Asian?”) with an easier question 
(“how many potential future Asian Nobel Peace Prize laureates can I think of?”) 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005). Subadditivity thus arises due to 
people expressing their beliefs, which can be based on both correct and incorrect evidence, 
and their probability judgments reflect the perceived weight of the evidence for each 
outcome. Support theory claims that people’s beliefs need not adhere to mathematical 
constraints, and thus allows probability judgments to be both non-extensional and non-
additive.  
However, the heuristics and bias tradition has been criticized for being “one word 
explanations” that do not specify the cognitive process underlying, for example, the 
representativeness and availability heuristics (Gigerenzer, 1998). In addition, it is argued 
that heuristics lack predictive validity, as it is difficult to predict in advance which heuristic 
participants will make use of (Anderson, 1991; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), though some 
attempts have been made (Braga, Ferreira, & Sherman, 2015). Thus, support theory does 
not fully account for the cognitive mechanisms involved in additivity neglect. Further, as 
support theory sidesteps participants lack of additivity by “strength of beliefs” not needing 
to comply with classical probability theory, it does not fully account for why people fail to 
adhere to the principle of additivity. Accordingly, support theory fails to explain that even 
when nothing is “hidden” from participants, they grossly overestimate the likelihood of 
each individual alternative. The questions of why people give belief based estimates 
disregarding the laws of probability and which cognitive mechanisms involved in such 
judgments thus still remains.  
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Numeracy and understanding probability theory 
In order to investigate if people’s failure to use formal mathematical theory is rooted 
in a lack of mathematical knowledge, we decided to investigate the relationship between 
additivity neglect and numeracy in Paper I. Numeracy is the ability to understand, use and 
reason with numbers (Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006). Moreover, numeracy as a construct 
does not merely reflect pure mathematical skills, but refers to mathematical or quantitative 
literacy (Ghazal, Cokely, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & 
Peters, 2008; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). In fact, the term numeracy was 
coined in 1959 by Geoffrey Crowther of the U.K. Committee on Education as a word for 
“numeral literacy” (Reyna et al., 2009). The most basic levels of numeracy involve 
understanding “the real number line, time, measurement and estimation” and “the ability to 
perform simple arithmetic operations and compare numerical magnitudes”. Higher levels of 
numeracy concerns “basic logic and quantitative reasoning skills, knowing when and how 
to perform multistep operations, and an understanding of ratio concepts like fractions, 
proportions, percentages and probabilities” (Reyna et al., 2009, p. 945).  
Given that several heuristics and bias tasks can be solved mathematically, it is 
reasonable to assume that individual differences in numeracy might be associated with 
correct responses to such tasks. Even though there are, to our knowledge, no other studies 
investigating the relationship between numeracy and additivity neglect (or subadditivity), 
numeracy has been found to predict susceptibility to several other biases (Liberali, Reyna, 
Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Peters, 2012; Peters & Levin, 2008; Winman et al., 2014). For 
example, Peters et al. (2006, Experiment I) found that participants with a higher numeracy 
score were less affected by attribute framing effects than those with a lower numeracy score. 
However, they found weak/no effects of numeracy on effects of risky choice framing 
(Peters & Levin, 2008). Several studies have also found that the more numerate participants 
perform better in Bayesian reasoning tasks (Chapman & Liu, 2009; Galesic, Gigerenzer, & 
Straubinger, 2009; Sirota & Juanchich, 2011), and make fewer conjunction and disjunction 
errors (Liberali et al., 2012; Winman et al., 2014). However, other studies have failed to 
find an effect of numeracy on conjunction errors (Wedell, 2011). The relationship between 
high numeracy and normative responses to classical heuristics and bias tasks is thus not 
clear cut.  
Over the years, several tests designed to measure numeracy have been developed. 
One of the earliest tests included only three items and was developed in order to assess 
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individual differences in ability to use numerical information about the benefit of 
mammography screening (Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997). The Lipkus 
numeracy test (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) was based on Schwartz et al.’s (1997) test 
with eight tasks added for a finer grained test. This test has been extensively used in 
educated samples, and we thus chose the Lipkus test for Experiment 1 (Paper I). However, 
in our student sample the Lipkus test yielded highly skewed scores, where almost 2/3 of our 
participants attained a score of 10 or 11 out of 11 possible, thus rendering a negatively 
skewed distribution of answers. During the data collection for Paper I we became aware of a 
newly developed numeracy test, namely the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT) allowing for a 
better discernment between highly educated samples (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & 
Garcia-Retamero, 2012). Experiment III thus used the BNT in order to further replicate the 
findings from Experiment I. The results from both experiments showed that numeracy was 
related to probability sums in the probability tasks.  
Some participants may not have the necessary mathematical skills in order to give 
additive responses. However, another explanation could be that they simply do not think 
about mathematical rules applying to the probability tasks, particularly for tasks where the 
probabilities cannot be calculated, but have to be given as subjective estimates. As 
providing additive responses is dependent on realizing that a mathematical rule is applicable 
to the situation, we were also interested in whether the numeracy test itself could function as 
“calculation priming”. Previous findings show that people’s mindset can affect their 
judgments (Bless, Betsch, & Franzen, 1998; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). For example, 
Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) found that priming people with either feeling or calculation 
affected their evaluation of second-hand box sets containing 5 or 10 Madonna CDs. 
Participants primed with calculation gave prices where the quantities of the items were 
taken into account, whereas those primed with feeling disregarded the set size, giving prices 
reflecting how much they liked the items. We thus decided to vary the order of the 
numeracy test, by either presenting it before or after the probability tasks.  
Differences in answering format 
 Differences in answering format emerged as an unexpected factor in explaining 
variations in additivity neglect (Riege, 2011; Paper I). However, it is well known in the 
literature that different contexts can affect people’s judgments (Bless et al., 1998; Brun & 
Teigen, 1988; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Reeves & 
Lockhart, 1993). For  example, providing participants with information about protagonists 
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in a case-specific manner leads to more conjunction and disjunction errors compared to 
frequentistic information (Reeves & Lockhart, 1993); and expressing probabilities as 
frequencies can reduce participants base-rate neglect (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).  
Other studies have also shown that judgments can be influenced by answering 
formats. For example, overconfidence in probabilistic judgments can be dependent on 
response formats (Juslin, Wennerholm, & Olsson, 1999; Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, 
& Barlas, 1999; Teigen & Jorgensen, 2005), such as half-range formats leading to under-
confidence, full-range format leading to more calibrated responses, and an interval format 
leading to overconfidence (Juslin et al., 1999). Within other domains there are also several 
studies showing that the way rating scales are constructed can influence participants 
answers (e.g., Schwarz, 1999). For example, when asking participants to report their success 
in life, varying the numbers of the 11-point scales ranging either from -5 to 5, or from 0 to 
10, produced considerably different answers, where almost three times as many participants 
used the left side of the scale in the first version compared to the second version (Schwarz, 
Knäuper, Hippler, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991). The authors argued that including the 
negative numbers made participants think not only of their success, but also of their failures. 
Thus, seemingly small differences in the task context can sometimes affect the way people 
think about the task at hand, and the answers they give.    
Case-based versus class-based approach  
Several studies have suggested that people can adopt two different approaches to 
probability judgments, namely a case-based or class-based approach (Fox & Rottenstreich, 
2003; Fox & Ülkümen, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Reeves & Lockhart, 1993; 
Teigen & Brun, 2011). Within psychology, the distinction originates from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982), who distinguish between singular versus distributional approaches 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klar, Medding, & Sarel, 1996; Reeves & Lockhart, 1993). It 
is beyond the present thesis to parse out the similarities and differences between these terms. 
The main issue is that these are two different ways of viewing external uncertainty 
(uncertainty related to events people cannot control). According to class-based 
(distributional) approach, the event in question is seen as one of several events or outcomes, 
and the relative frequencies of the event is known or can be estimated. Imagine a job hiring 
scenario with four applicants, and your job is to assess Bob’s chances of being hired. 
Without knowing anything about the applicants, allotting Bob a 25% chance would be a 
good guess. However, Bob has an excellent grade point average and 10 years of experience 
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from a similar job. What is Bob’s chance of being hired? Given this case-specific 
information it might be tempting to estimate Bob’s chances to be higher than 25%. This 
would be compatible with a class-based approach as long as the other applicants were 
adjusted downwards in a complementary fashion. A purely case-based (singular) approach 
would be to assess Bob’s probabilities of being hired based on his assets alone, disregarding 
the number and skills of his competitors. Case-based assessments are typically based on the 
perceived propensities of the particular event or case. It has been argued that people use the 
two approaches in different situations, favoring the class-based approach only when no 
individuating or case-specific information is available. For example, when judging 
vulnerability to negative life events, participants mostly considered statistical information, 
such as base-rates, when evaluating a generalized target (e.g., the average peer), while 
making use of case-specific information when considering a familiar target (e.g., self or 
close other) (Klar et al., 1996). The case-based approach is often favored by people in real 
life as case-specific information is often readily accessible (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  
Using a case-based approach also implies considering each alternative individually 
without much comparison between them, and as a consequence, allotting probabilities 
unaware of, or disregarding, the 100% “rule”. Further, understanding the complementary of 
the set of outcomes is a fundamental prerequisite for an additive response, making 
comparisons between the alternatives necessary. A class-based approach would therefore 
involve comparing all, or at least some of the alternatives, whilst keeping a mental tab of the 
100% “rule”. We argue in Paper I that the Self-generated format facilitated a class-based 
approach to the probability tasks, and we wanted to further investigate this claim in Paper II 
using eye-tracking methodology allowing us to monitor participant’s eye-movements during 
the judgment tasks. Process tracing methods offer a means to gain insight to the decision 
process itself, instead of inferring the process based on the end result (the judgments). It has 
thus become increasingly common to use process measures in judgment and decision 
making research, as a means to further understand the underlying cognitive processes 
(Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kuehberger, & Ranyard, 2010; Schulte-
Mecklenbeck, Kuhberger, & Ranyard, 2011).    
We also hypothesize that a class-based approach will be more cognitively 
demanding than the case-based approach, because one has to combine the evaluation of 
case-specific information with a strict numerical rule. Interestingly, Robinson and Hastie 
(1985, Experiment 1) taught one group of participants probability theory prior to the 
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(aforementioned) murder mystery tasks. Aside from these participants giving additive 
responses, verbal reports revealed that staying within the normative limit was a difficult task. 
Participants also seemed to narrow the number of suspects early, probably as a way of 
reducing the number of alternatives they had to consider. This indicates that giving additive 
responses with multiple comparisons between the alternatives involves a high cognitive 
load. This hypothesis could be investigated further by means of an eye-tracker, as the 
equipment also monitors fixation durations which are often used as proxies for cognitive 
load (Findlay & Kapoula, 1992; Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Gloeckner, 2009; Velichkovskiĭ, 
1999). 
As Paper II indicated that the two answering formats led to (somewhat) different 
cognitive processes, where the Self-generated format prompted more comparisons, we 
decided to include a different process measure in Paper III, namely a retrospective verbal 
report. In a previous study, investigating unrealistic optimism in comparative risk 
judgments, participants were asked to provide written accounts of their thought processes 
(Klar et al., 1996, Experiment 3). The results indicated that participants often used case-
specific information in their decisions, indicating a case-based approach to the probability 
judgments. As we were interested in the violation of the mathematical rules, we asked 
participants why they had, or in most cases, why they had not, adhered to the normative 
rules. Our aim was to investigate if some participants would describe a case-based 
assessment of the alternatives, by for example answering that they considered the 
alternatives one-by-one.  
The literature cited so far belongs at large to a cognitive approach to subjective 
probability judgments. Interestingly, within the social psychology literature one can find a 
distinction similar to case-based vs. class-based approaches to referent-dependent 
judgments, labeled selective vs. comparative processing (Kardes, 2013; Sanbonmatsu et al., 
1998; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997; Sanbonmatsu, Vanous, Hook, Posavac, & Kardes, 2011). 
Selective processing resembles the case-based approach in that people have a tendency to 
search for evidence related to the target or focal event, rather than evidence related to the 
referents (Sanbonmatsu et al., 1997). A large body of research has indicated that several 
biases or judgmental errors can result from selective processing (Kardes, 2013; 
Sanbonmatsu et al., 1998; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). 
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The nonselective superiority bias 
As mentioned above, a large body of research has indicated that several biases or 
judgmental errors can result from selective processing (or a case-based approach), amongst 
them both the nonselective superiority bias and subadditivity (Kardes, 2013; Posavac, 
Brakus, Cronley, & Jain, 2009; Posavac, Brakus, Jain, & Cronley, 2006; Sanbonmatsu, 
Posavac, Kardes, & Mantel, 1998; Sanbonmatsu, Vanous, Hook, Posavac, & Kardes, 2011). 
However, these biases are rarely studied together, despite an assumption of their shared 
foundation. In Paper III we wanted to compare additivity neglect to the nonselective 
superiority bias in a parallel design, and involving the same participants.  
The nonselective superiority bias (NSSB) is the phenomenon where participants 
consistently judge individual members of a positive set of items (e.g., five attractive 
vacation spots, five pleasant smelling soaps) as superior to most other members in the set 
(Bruchmann et al., 2013; Giladi & Klar, 2002; Klar, 2002; Krizan & Suls, 2008; Suls et al., 
2010; Windschitl, Conybeare, et al., 2008). This systematic judgment of all items in a set as 
superior to each other violates elementary logic, as some members cannot be better unless 
others are worse.  
The similarity between additivity neglect and the nonselective superiority bias can 
be observed in several aspects: firstly, both biases have at large been studied in between-
group designs, presumably under the assumption that using a within-group design would 
reduce the bias. However, as with additivity neglect, a few studies have indicated that 
merely asking participants to judge the full set of outcomes does not alleviate the bias 
(Chambers, 2010, Experiment 2; Klar, 2002, Experiment 4).  Secondly, both types of 
referent-dependent judgments seem to be made in a non-complementary fashion, that is, 
participants appear to view selected items as unrelated to the other items in the set. Lastly, 
some of the mechanisms posited to explain NSSB are similar to those suggested for 
additivity neglect. Despite these similarities, few attempts have been made to study these 
two biases together (for a recent integrated treatment, see Smith, Windschitl, & Rose, 2015).  
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Methodological considerations 
Participants 
The participants in the three papers were either students recruited from various 
universities, or participants recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All 
participants in Papers I and II were students, mainly from the University of Oslo, but also 
from the Universities of Bergen and Tromsø, and from BI Norwegian Business School. 
Except for the students in Experiment 3 in Paper I, the students did not receive any 
compensation for their participation.  Participants in Paper III were all recruited from 
MTurk (www.MTurk.com), which is an online marketplace offering people small jobs they 
can complete in their own homes. The site thus contains the main elements required to 
conduct research: a large participant pool with an integrated system for compensation and a 
streamlined process of participant recruitment and data collection. In general, MTurk 
workers are diverse, but several studies have indicated that they, as is the case with student 
populations (Peterson, 2001; Sears, 1986), differ from the general population in several 
characteristics. For example, MTurk workers tend to have a lower income, and are younger, 
less religious, and more liberal than the general population (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; 
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Studies have also indicated that the MTurk samples 
differ in some personality traits and are less extraverted than students and the general public 
(Goodman, Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). Investigations of cognitive abilities have found no 
difference between MTurkers’ and students’ numeracy scores (Paolacci et al., 2010), and a 
recent study indicates that MTurkers are more attentive to instructions than students and 
thus show larger effects in response to subtle manipulations (Hauser & Schwarz, 2015a). 
However, MTurk samples are more diverse than student samples (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011), particularly in regards to demographic variables. Regardless of the relative 
merits of these two populations, neither can be considered as representative of the general 
population. Thus, the current findings may not be valid in all samples or in all cultures. 
Nonetheless, some of the effects reported in the present work have been found in student 
samples all across Norway, and in MTurk samples located in the US, yielding some 
generalizability.  
External validity of Questionnaire-based experiments 
 All studies have been questionnaire-based experiments, conducted either in a 
classroom setting (Experiments 1, 2, and 3, in Paper I), as online experiments (Experiment 4 
in Paper I, Experiments 1, 2, and 3, in Paper III), or in a laboratory setting (Paper II). There 
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are several unnatural aspects of such experimental settings, which might cause people to 
consider the tasks differently than they would in a more natural environment.  
The physical setting is perhaps most artificial in the classroom and laboratory 
settings, although this might not be so unnatural for students who frequent such places often. 
Regardless, in lecture halls there are many students as data collection is often done during a 
break, and this might reduce concentration. In the laboratory participants were in a small 
room together with the experimenter, giving estimations whilst trying to sit still and not to 
blink too much, which is an unnatural situation. The MTurk workers can have been 
anywhere, which could have affected their responses. However, all MTurk studies included 
an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), presented at the end of the 
questionnaire (Hauser & Schwarz, 2015b) ,  asking participants a multiple choice question 
where the correct answer was provided in the instructions. Most importantly, despite 
participants’ location or experimental setting, the same pattern of judgments was found in 
classrooms, the lab, and in online experiments. In addition, subadditivity has been replicated 
in numerous samples including various expert populations with a high external validity (e.g., 
search and rescue workers using maps in Hill, 2012).      
The tasks and the topics of the tasks include vignettes of both real and hypothetical 
situations, and topics. Not everyone has knowledge about the selected topics, nor an interest 
in politics, football, hiring situations, possible reasons for car trouble, etc. However, the 
numerous tasks given to participants cover a wide array of topics, all showing a similar 
pattern of results.  
Eye-tracking 
Though process-tracing methods such as eye-tracking have become more common 
in psychological research, the interpretations of the results are still contingent on auxiliary 
hypotheses about what the specific eye-tracking measures mean. The most fundamental 
problem with eye-tracking is the assumption that the viewer’s attention is fixed at the gaze 
point, commonly referred to as the eye-mind hypothesis (Just & Carpenter, 1980). We 
assume that the recorded fixations give information about what participants are looking at, 
though people are perfectly capable of directing their attention to their peripheral visual 
field, without moving their gaze (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). However, gaze and 
attention are usually closely linked, with attention being directed at a target shortly before 
the gaze (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995). In addition, detaching attention away from the 
gaze requires effort, thus making it less likely that participants would make such an effort in 
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our experimental setting. However, if the visual stimuli is “cluttered” making the Areas of 
Interest (AOI) small and closely spaced together, it is possible for participants to see several 
AOI’s in their (semi)peripheral vision, making it difficult to know what they have really 
been attending to (Orquin, Ashby, & Clarke, 2015). A related problem is that even though 
the eye-tracker is calibrated with great care at the beginning of each data collection, 
participants might move their head, blink too frequently, etc., thus reduce the accuracy of 
the measurement. Again, if the AOI’s are small or closely spaced together, even small 
deviations in the calibration can affect the results (Orquin et al., 2015). However, recent 
advances in eye-tracking technology has increased the precision in terms of collecting both 
temporal and spatial information (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011), and we used a 9-point 
calibration to make sure our measurements were as accurate as possible. 
 Another auxiliary assumption concerns fixation durations, which are seen as an 
indirect measure of cognitive load, where longer fixations reflect more cognitive effort than 
short fixations (Findlay & Kapoula, 1992; Horstmann et al., 2009). However, some studies 
have shown that long fixation durations do not always indicate high cognitive effort. For 
example, people driving in monotone and boring landscapes have very long fixation-
durations (Holmqvist, 2011). In such cases it is easy to understand that the fixation 
durations are not connected with high cognitive load. However, other situations may be less 
transparent thus leading to incorrect interpretations. In Paper II we found some evidence 
that longer fixation durations were associated with additive responses. As additive responses 
are contingent on mental calculations, it is reasonable to assume that the longer fixation 
durations indicate a higher cognitive load. We also asked our participants informally, both 
after completing the eye-tracking experiment and other experiments, how they experienced 
our tasks. Several participants have mentioned that they found it taxing to adhere to the 
100% - rule. 
Lastly, it is important to consider whether introducing a process method such as eye-
tracking can alter the decision making process. Several comparative studies have shown that 
some process methods influence the decision process by for example adding extra cognitive 
demand (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Lohse & Johnson, 1996). For example, a comparison 
between eye-tracking and Mouse Lab showed that participants’ needed more time to gather 
information and that information acquisition behavior tended to be more systematic in 
Mouse Lab compared to eye-tracking (Lohse & Johnson, 1996), thus indicating that eye-
tracking as a method affected participants behavior less than Mouse Lab. Further, as eye 
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movements require little deliberate effort, it is unlikely that the process tracing actually 
alters the decision making process (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). More importantly, 
participants in Paper II demonstrated the same additivity neglect and answering format 
differences as participants in Papers I and III. These measures were independent of the eye-
tracker indicating that the eye-tracker did not affect the outcomes of participants’ 
judgments. 
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Summary of papers 
Paper I - Additivity neglect in probability estimates: Effects of numeracy and response 
format  
Authors: Anine H. Riege and Karl Halvor Teigen 
Several studies have shown that people who are asked to estimate the probabilities 
for an exhaustive set of more than two events often produce probabilities that add up to 
more than 1 or 100% (Robinson & Hastie, 1985; Teigen, 1974b, 1983). We draw a 
distinction between studies of local additivity where participants are given a disjunctive 
subset of outcomes, and studies of global additivity which entail a total exhaustive set of 
outcomes. Both biases are often referred to as subadditive judgments, but to distinguish 
between the two, we call the latter additivity neglect. The aim of Paper I was to investigate 
several determinants for such additivity neglect.  
A series of pilot experiments, using both real life and hypothetical vignettes, were 
conducted in order to investigate possible determinants of additivity neglect. Two of the 
pilot experiments, Pilot A and B, had three interesting findings that warranted further 
investigation (for a full description, see Riege, 2011). Firstly, Pilot A and B used different 
answering formats: whereas Pilot A asked participants to write down their own probabilities, 
Pilot B used scales ranging from 0% to 100%, with increments of 10. Participants in the 
latter gave relatively fewer additive responses compared to the former, indicating that the 
answering format affected participants’ additivity neglect. Secondly, both Pilot A and Pilot 
B used numeracy tests and probability sums were in both experiments negatively correlated 
with numeracy scores. These correlations were, however, only significant for the vignettes 
in Pilot A. In Pilot A the numeracy test was introduced on the last page. Inspection of the 
questionnaires revealed that several participants had changed their responses. If these 
changes had occurred after seeing the numeracy test, it was possible that the numeracy test 
itself could serve as a reminder of a mathematical rule being relevant when answering the 
probability tasks. Lastly, both pilots had given participants disjunctive probability tasks, 
asking participants to estimate the chances for five individual teams to be No.1 or No. 2 in a 
group tournament. Disjunctive probabilities should, on average, be twice the probabilities of 
becoming No. 1, but were judged to be only 10–15% higher. Performance on the disjunctive 
tasks appeared to be unrelated to numeracy.   
Experiment 1 gave participants five probability tasks pertaining to current events 
such as a forthcoming political election and the qualification playoffs of Group H in UEFA 
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EURO 2012. Each task had 4 or 5 outcomes, and participants were asked to judge the 
probabilities of all the alternatives. The aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effects 
of priming participants with a “calculation” mindset by giving one group the Lipkus (2001) 
numeracy test before performing the estimation tasks, while another group performed the 
estimation task first. The estimation tasks and the response format (rating scales) were 
identical in both groups. In addition, we wanted to further investigate the underestimation of 
disjunctive probabilities observed in the pilot studies. In the pilot experiments these 
estimates were made by participants in different conditions. As a means to enhance the 
difference between single and disjunctive estimates, Experiment 1 gave the same 
participants three single outcome tasks and two disjunctive outcome tasks.  
The results showed that additive responses were twice as common in the Numeracy 
first as in the Numeracy last condition, indicating that the Numeracy scale “primed” 
participants to answer according to mathematical principles. However, the priming appeared 
to be most effective for participants with a high numeracy score, indicating that it is not 
sufficient to have high numeracy; one must also be reminded that mathematical rules might 
apply. Most participants gave higher probability sums for the disjunctive tasks, but this 
increase was not sufficient according to normative expectations. The probability estimates 
for the disjunctive outcome tasks were unrelated to participants’ numeracy and the 
mathematical mindset priming manipulation.    
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the format difference observed in the 
pilot experiments. In addition, there were three outcome conditions that asked participants 
to assess the probabilities for each of five teams becoming No. 1, No. 2, or among the two 
best (No. 1 or No. 2). Within each outcome condition, probability estimates were given 
either by selecting a number on separate scales (scale format), or by filling in appropriate 
percentages in empty slots where the teams were listed (written format). Differing results in 
the pilot experiments suggested that the second arrangement may facilitate more additive 
responses. The present experiment was set up to test this conjecture. The results showed a 
clear tendency for estimates in the written format to be lower than estimates in the scale 
format. There was also a tendency for participants to judge the probability of winning to be 
higher than probability of becoming second best, and the estimates of disjunctive 
probabilities were, in both formats, quite close to the estimates of single outcomes. Thus 
participants in this experiment perceive the probabilities of being among the two best and 
the probabilities of becoming the winner as very similar, and far from being the sum of 
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becoming No. 1 and No. 2. Lower probabilities in the written format were associated with a 
higher frequency of additive responses, and participants in the single outcome conditions 
using the written format produced far more additive sums than participants in the scale 
conditions.  
 One of the limitations with the Lipkus scale is that it produces a negatively skewed 
distribution of answers with a large proportion of high numeracy scores (in Experiment 1 
almost 2/3 of student participants attained a score of 10 or 11 out of 11 possible).  
Experiment 3 was designed to further investigate the role of numeracy and to replicate the 
two main findings in the previous experiments, using a more appropriate measure of 
numeracy. We used a recently developed and more advanced numeracy test, namely the 
Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Garcia-Retamero, & Ghazal, 2012). 
Participants were given three probability tasks. Two tasks were about the four remaining 
teams (at the time) in the Norwegian football championship where one task asked 
participants to predict the chances for each team becoming No.1 and the second task the 
chances of becoming No.2. The last task was about an upcoming political election. The 
experiment utilized two manipulations; the presentation order of the numeracy test 
(numeracy scale first vs. last) and response format (scale vs. written). As in Experiment 2, 
the written format led to a much higher number of additive responses than the scale format, 
for all vignettes. The Berlin Numeracy Test led to a positively skewed distribution of scores, 
and the participants probability estimates were inversely related to numeracy scores on the 
Berlin test. The correlations between numeracy scores and mean probability estimates only 
reached significance for the participants who received the numeracy test first, again 
indicating that the effects of numeracy are amplified when mathematical skills are activated.  
Experiment 4 was designed to disentangle one of the differences between the 
answering formats. The written format lead to twice as many additive responses as the scale 
format, but this difference could either be due to visual display (the alternatives are spaced 
further apart in the scale format because they are separated by the scales themselves) or to 
response factors (writing in the probabilities vs. circling numbers on a scale). Participants 
were given three probability tasks with four or five different outcomes each. Experiment 4 
contained two conditions where all alternatives were displayed on one screen, with 
responses given either in the written format or in scale format. In the two other conditions, 
the alternatives were presented sequentially on separate screens, requiring either self-
generated responses (written format) or ratings on 11 point scales (scale format). The results 
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showed that the advantage of a written format persisted, albeit slightly reduced, even when 
the estimates were given on separate screens. This suggests that self-generated estimates 
require participants to think more carefully about the task, perhaps encouraging an 
analytical approach. In contrast, a row of numbers displayed along a rating scale might 
appear to license the choice of any number that happens to match one’s gut feelings. 
Despite the apparent “ease” of rating scale responses, few were additive, indicating that 
additivity is not simply obtained by alleviating the cognitive load.  
Overall, the results of Paper I show that response format plays a decisive role in 
additivity neglect. Numerical estimates written by participants themselves appear to 
facilitate additive responding, whereas estimates made by circling numbers on separate 
scales for each alternative seem to promote unconstrained case-based responses. Also, the 
effect of numeracy on additive probability estimates is greatest for highly numerate 
participants when primed to think in a mathematical manner. Very few participants adjusted 
their estimates sufficiently in the disjunctive outcome tasks regardless of their answers in 
the single outcome tasks, the answering format or numeracy. The kind of reasoning that 
facilitates additive responding in the single outcome condition does therefore not 
necessarily imply a deeper understanding of the principles of probability calculation. 
 
Paper II - Format dependent probabilities: An eye-tracking analysis of additivity 
neglect 
Authors: Anine H. Riege, Unni Sulutvedt, and Karl Halvor Teigen 
In this paper we wanted to further explore the difference in answering format found 
in Paper I, where writing estimates in an empty slot next to each specified outcome in the 
set generated more additive estimates than giving estimates by circling numbers on 0-100% 
horizontal rating scales. It is important to investigate this finding further as such answering 
formats are often used interchangeably in probability estimation tasks. In Paper I we 
suggested that the difference in answering format could elicit different cognitive processes; 
Paper II thus used an eye-tracking measure to attempt to investigate the underlying 
judgment process.  
Eye movements are naturally occurring behaviors and a generally accepted measure 
of attention, information acquisition, and as a means to infer cognitive processes (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011; Russo, 2011; Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). Monitoring eye 
movements provides information about the decision process by registering what participants 
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are looking at (fixations) and their search strategies by recording the direction of these 
fixations. Moreover, information about cognitive load can be inferred by looking at 
individual fixations’ fixation durations within and between tasks (Findlay & Kapoula, 1992; 
Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009). It is also possible to monitor participants 
repeated inspections of the same material, by counting the number of revisits between 
(pre)defined Areas of Interest (AOI) within each task. We predicted that fixations, fixation 
durations, and repeated inspections of outcomes (revisits) will differ based on whether 
participants assign probabilities by judging the alternatives one by one, in a case-based 
manner, or additively, as members of a set, which requires a distributive approach where 
alternatives are compared to each other.  
Participants were given ten probability tasks pertaining to both real-life and 
hypothetical uncertain events, and two control tasks describing chance events where 
probabilities could be obtained by calculation. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
the Self-generated answering format or the Scale format. The results showed that 
participants in the Self-generated condition had significantly more additive responses than 
participants in the Scale condition, replicating the results from Paper I. However, this 
finding did not extend to the control tasks where almost all participants gave probability 
estimates within the 100% limit. Also, participants spent more time completing the tasks in 
the Self-generated condition, indicating that they might need more time to revise their 
responses making sure they adhered to the 100%-rule. Despite the visual display in the 
Scale condition offering participants more to look at, participants in the Self-generated 
conditions had more fixations. However, as participants in the Self-generated condition 
spent more time answering the tasks, it is not unreasonable that they also had more 
fixations; the longer you look at something, the more fixations you will invariably have. 
Interestingly, the opposite pattern was observed in the control tasks, where participants in 
the Scale condition had more fixations than those in the Self-generated condition, although 
there was no difference in the time spent on the control tasks between the two conditions.  
As predicted, participants in the Self-generated condition had on average almost 
twice as many revisits between the alternatives compared to the Scale condition. This 
indicates that participants in the Self-generated condition were conducting more 
comparisons between the alternatives, rather than evaluating each alternative individually. It 
is easy to imagine that comparisons are important for accomplishing an additive response 
pattern, as it requires seeing the alternatives as a complete set. We also expected to find that 
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the participants in the Self-generated condition had longer fixation durations than 
participants in the Scale condition.  Although the percentages of “long” fixations (≥ 500 ms) 
were considerably higher than reported elsewhere in eye-tracking literature on decision 
making, there was no difference between the conditions. This indicates that our probability 
estimation tasks, regardless of answering format, require considerable cognitive effort. A 
closer inspection of the standard deviations did, however, show that the fixation durations 
were more variable in the Self-generated condition. A multiple regression analysis showed 
that fixation durations were positively related to the number of additive outcomes. 
However, these results do not allow any strong inferences to be drawn about the causal 
relationship between search pattern and additivity. Overall, the results from Paper II 
indicate that the Scale format might prompt a selective evaluation of the alternatives, and 
thereby discourage comparisons between alternatives. The Self-generated estimates 
facilitate a class-based approach and make people engage in a more comprehensive search 
pattern.  
 
Paper III – Everybody will win, and all must be hired: Comparing additivity neglect 
with the nonselective superiority bias.  
Authors: Anine H. Riege and Karl Halvor Teigen  
There are several types of biases that can occur in referent-dependent judgments, 
additivity neglect being but one. However, they are rarely studied together or compared. As 
an attempt to compare two such biases, Paper III looked at both the nonselective superiority 
bias and additivity neglect, as both biases violate basic formal constraints. The nonselective 
superiority bias (NSSB) is the consistent evaluations of individual members of a positive set 
of items (e.g., five attractive vacation spots) as superior to most other members in the set 
(Giladi & Klar, 2002); additivity neglect is the overestimations of the probabilities for most 
alternatives in a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes (Riege & Teigen, 2013). 
The errors in judgments lies in that a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as better 
than the group mean, and the probabilities of a set of exhaustive events cannot add up to 
more than 100%. We distinguish between the two judgments by calling the former a 
“comparative judgment” and normative answers “balanced”. The latter is referred to as 
probability judgments and normative answers are additive. 
It is interesting to compare these two biases as they both seem to involve a 
consistent overestimation of people, items or outcomes in a positively valued, exhaustive set. 
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Also, participants’ judgments seem to be made in a non-complementary fashion as if one 
alternative’s chances or superiority does not affect the relative standing of the others in the 
group. This implies that both biases might depend on selective processing (Kardes, 2013). 
Further, other mechanisms proposed in order to explain the biases are also similar. Finally, 
these biases share a similar methodological research design, by both being mostly studied in 
between-group designs. The aim of Paper III was to empirically compare additivity neglect 
and the nonselective superiority bias in a within-participant design. Our hypothesis was that 
people who exhibit these biases fail to realize the normative requirement, which leads to a 
failure to control the sums of their probability estimates or the means of their comparative 
ratings.  
Participants in Experiment 1 were asked to give both probability estimates and 
comparative judgments, two tasks for each type, for sets of five Oscar nominees in various 
categories. In all tasks, the five nominated actors/actresses in the category were listed on the 
same page. We also attempted to induce comparative processing by asking participants in 
one condition to rank-order the alternatives before answering the probability tasks. The 
results showed that the two biases were related, and that participants who gave additive 
responses also gave more balanced ratings. There was, however, no effect of the rank-
ordering, rendering further evidence to the difficulty of inducing comparative processing. 
In Experiment 2 participants gave comparative judgments and probability estimates 
to sets of four shortlisted job applicants. The comparative judgments were ratings regarding 
the applicants’ qualifications, and the probability judgments were each applicant’s chances 
of being hired.  In order to allow a direct comparison between the two types of judgments, 
participants were given a prepared, “balanced” set of unbiased qualification ratings, and 
asked to “translate” these ratings into probabilities. They were also given a prepared, 
additive set of probability estimates and asked to translate these into relative qualification 
ratings. The results again showed that additive respondents in general gave more balanced 
ratings, regardless of condition. However, there was a negative correlation between the 
average ratings given to the two types of tasks. In the presented tables, probabilities had to 
be low (around 25%) to satisfy the additivity requirement. Many participants felt that this 
indicated rather poor (below average) qualifications. In other words, despite an ignorance 
prior of 25% for 4 job applicants, a 30% chance was translated into an applicant with less 
than average qualifications. At the same time, these unbiased ratings also gave participants 
a hint of the normative requirements of such judgments. The order of the two types of tasks 
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were counterbalanced, and the results showed that participants who were presented with 
additive probability sets first (to be “translated” into comparative judgments), produced 
more additive probability sets when translating qualification ratings in the second part of the 
experiment, compared to participants who received the tasks in reverse order. This might 
indicate that some participants were “reminded” of the normative rule when exposed to 
additive sets of probability. 
Previous studies of additivity neglect have shown a difference in additivity based on 
the answering format, where participants are more additive when given a Self-generated 
format. In Experiments 1 and 2, all probability tasks used the Self-generated format, while 
the qualification ratings used a scale format. In Experiment 3 participants were again given 
both types of tasks, but with a between-group manipulation of the answering format where 
half of the participants were given the Scale format and the other half was given the Self-
generated format. In addition, participants were asked if they had thought about the 
normative constraints, and to give a reason why they had / had not decided to answer in 
accordance with these requirements. The results again showed that participants who 
produced additive probability estimates gave more balanced NSSB ratings, than those who 
gave non-additive estimates. Despite the answering format not affecting participants’ NSSB, 
the correlation between participants mean ratings and mean probabilities in the Scale format 
reached a correlation of r(84) = .60, p < .001, compared to more moderate correlations in 
the Self-generated condition and in Experiment 1. Further, the results revealed that overall 
only 31.5% of the participants had thought about the 100% rule or about balancing their 
ratings for at least some of the tasks. The verbal data indicated that beside reasons such as 
“it wasn’t in the instructions”, or “I didn’t think about it”, there were two main reasons for 
participants’ overestimations: 1) they reported that they had considered the alternatives 
individually; 2) they thought it was unfair or incorrect, to give good job applicants a low 
chance or a low rating.  
The three experiments reported in Paper III indicate several commonalities between 
additivity neglect and the nonselective superiority bias. Both biases seem to be about 
equally widespread, occurring in a majority of participants even when presented with the 
full set of alternatives. The two biases were also related, as participants who gave additive 
probability estimates gave more balanced distributions of ratings to the NSSB task. 
However, NSSB seems to be more robust in the sense that the degree of bias could not be 
reduced by changing the answering format to a Self-generated format. Previous studies of 
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both biases have focused on the differences between selective and comparative processing 
and some studies suggest that inducing comparative processing by asking participants to 
evaluate all the alternatives may alleviate bias in referent-dependent judgments. This was 
not the case in the present studies. Explanations of biases in referent-dependent judgments 
must give an account of two prominent and separable findings: (1) why the formal rules are 
neglected, and (2) why the distributions of answers are positively skewed. 
General Discussion  
The present dissertation investigated subadditive judgments that violate the principle 
of additivity stating that the probability of a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of 
outcomes cannot exceed 1 or 100%. In Paper I we found evidence of two relevant factors 
that affected participants’ additivity neglect. Firstly, we found that participants with high 
numeracy produced more additive responses in the single outcome events, indicating that 
mathematical knowledge can reduce participants’ bias. Also, “priming” participants by 
giving them the numeracy test before the probability tasks led to more additive responses, 
indicating that it might not be apparent to all participants that mathematical norms apply to 
the situation. Secondly, Paper I revealed that participants additivity neglect is affected by 
the answering formats they are given: writing the probabilities in empty slots next to the 
alternatives (Self-generated format) lead to more additive responses than circling numbers 
on a scale (Scale format). Paper II found that the Self-generated format seems to encourage 
a more class-based, or comparative, processing with more comparisons between the 
alternatives in the set. Paper III compared additivity neglect to another bias that can arise in 
referent-dependent judgments, namely the nonselective superiority bias (NSSB). The results 
demonstrated that the same participants often display both biases. In addition, several 
people reported their failure to consider normative constraints as due to considering 
alternatives independently, or because the constraints would lead to “unfair” or incorrect 
judgments. In the General discussion we will take a closer look at the mechanisms that may 
be responsible for these effects, and report results from three follow-up experiments and a 
reanalysis of the data from Paper II, that were designed to examine the source of format 
effects.  
Numeracy and cognitive ability 
As participants’ answers to our probabilistic tasks are evaluated based on whether 
they comply with the mathematical norm of additivity, we wanted to investigate if correct 
answers to these tasks is related to numeracy in Paper I. We predicted that participants with 
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a high numeracy score would give lower probability estimates and be less prone to 
additivity neglect compared to participants with a low numeracy score. We also wanted to 
investigate the boundaries of peoples’ understanding of probabilities by including tasks with 
disjunctive outcome events.  
The results from Paper I demonstrated that when the numeracy test is introduced 
prior to the probability tasks, participants with a high numeracy particularly benefitted from 
the “reminder” and gave more additive responses. Performance on the disjunctive tasks, on 
the other hand, appeared to be unrelated to numeracy. Even though most participants gave 
higher probability sums for the disjunctive tasks, the increase was not sufficient according 
to normative expectations. However, the relationship between numeracy and the estimates 
for the disjunctive outcome events was only investigated using the Lipkus (2001) test. As 
already noted, the Lipkus test is subject to a ceiling effect in educated samples. As we did 
not investigate the disjunctive outcome events with the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT), which 
is better at discerning the numeracy level in student populations, we cannot exclude the 
possibility of numeracy being a factor in understanding disjunctive outcome events. It is 
also likely that understanding the set requirements for disjunctive outcome events require 
higher level of numeracy than that measured by the Lipkus test. Future studies could 
investigate the role of numeracy in disjunctive outcome events using the BNT.  
Given that both “priming” participants with a numeracy test and the Self-generated 
answering format leads to more additive responses, there are clearly certain contexts that 
aids normative responses. We also have some evidence that these contexts particularly aid 
those with higher numeracy. There has been much debate about the individual differences 
involved in predicting normative responses to heuristics and biases tasks. Investigations 
have included general ability or intelligence, thinking dispositions (e.g., measures such as 
the cognitive reflection test) and numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; 
Stanovich & West, 2008; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). Some show that normative 
responses are relatively unrelated to cognitive abilities (Stanovich & West, 2008), others 
claim that a high general ability is needed, but not sufficient without a favorable thinking 
disposition and high numeracy (Klaczynski, 2014). Some studies claim that thinking 
dispositions have a high predictive validity (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2013), whereas 
other studies indicate that such measures explain less variance than “pure” numeric ability 
(Sinayev & Peters, 2015).   
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However, it has recently been suggested that the predictive power of numeracy does 
not necessarily come from individual differences in mathematical aptitude, but individual 
differences in metacognition (Ghazal et al., 2014). Metacognition is often defined as 
“thinking about thinking”, and includes both the knowledge and beliefs about cognition, and 
the regulation and control of cognition (Brown, 1987; Garofalo & Lester, 1985). 
Metacognitive strategies have been described as sequential processes used to control 
cognitive activities, as a means to ensure reaching a cognitive goal. Because normative 
responses to referent-dependent judgments require complementarity and staying within 
limits, adhering to these constraints requires either continuous updates and adjustments, or 
going over one’s responses after all judgments have been performed. Regardless, such 
normative constraints require participants to be willing to take a second look and revise 
their estimates if needed, which can be seen as a metacognitive strategy. Some studies have 
also suggested that metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency can prompt 
participants to take a more analytic approach to the task at hand, and at times even correct 
the more intuitive responses (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). Further support for 
the need to take a second look is illustrated in Paper II where participants in the Self-
generated condition spent more time answering the additivity tasks compared to participants 
in the Scale condition. It is difficult to determine whether it is participants’ numerical skills 
or their metacognitive abilities that underlie our findings in Paper I. However, different 
superior cognitive skills are often connected as individuals with a high numeracy often also 
have superior metacognitive abilities, thus making it difficult to parse out the effect of each 
skill. Future studies of additivity neglect, and other biases in referent-dependent judgments, 
should investigate the role of metacognition as a determinant for normative responses.   
Effects of answering format 
Several studies have shown that contexts, such as the way questions are posed, or 
the way rating scales are constructed, can strongly influence the answers obtained (e.g., 
Schwarz, 1999). All three papers report that participants display less additivity neglect when 
they are given the Self-generated answering format. Paper II also shows that this difference 
is reflected in different visual patterns for participants in the two formats, where the Self-
generated format has almost twice the number of revisits between the alternatives compared 
to the Scale format. However, this does not explain why the difference occurs, and there are 
several competing explanations. The alternative explanations are explored in three new 
experiments from a manuscript in preparation, and a reanalysis of the data from Paper II. 
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Lastly, I also report a follow-up study on answering format and the nonselective superiority 
bias.  
Differences in cognitive processing. One explanation is that the process of 
generating the probabilities without the “aid” of the scale leads to a deeper processing 
(Paper I), that makes participants realize that the alternatives are part of a “fixed pie” and 
that you can’t have your pie and eat it too. We also found that when the numeracy test was 
given prior to the probability tasks it acted as a reminder to the more numerate participants 
that a mathematical rule applied to the situation. Others have found that contexts facilitating 
normative responses given in a within-Ss design produces a carryover effect to tasks 
without the facilitating aid (e.g., Reeves & Lockhart, 1993). Taken together, one would 
expect that participants given the Self-generated format first will become more additive 
even if the answering format changes. In Experiment 1 in an unpublished manuscript 
(Riege, Sulutvedt, Bjørgfinsdottir, & Miljeteig, 2015), we gave 76 MTurk workers six 
probability tasks, similar to those reported in the present dissertation. Participants in 
Condition 1 were presented with the Self-generated format for the three first tasks, followed 
by three tasks using the Scale format. Participants in Condition 2 were given the same tasks 
in opposite order, i.e., they received the Scale format first, followed by the Self-generated 
format. The results showed that in the group that was given the Self-generated format first 
(Condition 1), 34% of the participants gave at least one additive response to the Scale 
format tasks, versus 19% in the group that got the Scale tasks first. Out of these, seven gave 
additive responses to all three Scale tasks in Condition 1 (Self-generated first), versus only 
one in Condition 2 (Scale first). These numbers suggest a small effect on additivity neglect 
by being presented with the Self-generated format first. However, a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
using number of additive responses for each format (Self-generated vs. Scale) as the within-
subjects factor and condition as a between-Ss factor (Self-generated first vs. Scale first), 
revealed no effect of condition (F(1,74) = 1.94, p = .168, η2 = .026). When the same 
ANOVA was run using participants mean probability sums for each format (Self-generated 
vs. Scale) as the within-subjects factor there was a marginally significant main effect of 
condition (F(1,74) = 3.48, p = .06, η2 = .045). Thus, there might be a slight benefit to 
receiving the Self-generated format prior to the Scale format for some participants, as it 
leads to slightly lower probability sums, but being presented with the Self-generated format 
first does not change the number of additive responses  in the subsequent Scale format. We 
cannot completly rule out that the Self-generated format serves as a reminder, though it 
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seems unlikely. One possibility is that as the additivity principle is not explicitly stated, 
participants could decide not to further uphold the 100% - rule when switched to the Scale 
condition, due to a lack of motivation or exhaustion. In Paper II we found that participants 
in both conditions had a significant proportion of long fixation durations (M(Self-generated) = 
11% and M(Scale) = 13% of fixations that were longer than 500 ms), indicating that our 
judgment tasks are taxing. Alternatively, there could be something about the Scale format 
that makes it even more difficult to adhere to the 100% - rule. 
Differences in visual display. In Paper II, we suggested that the differences 
between the two answering formats might arise from the differences in the visual display. 
For example, there is a difference in how far the alternatives are spaced from each other. An 
early eye-tracking study showed that participants often chose to compare pairs of 
alternatives based on spatial proximity (Russo & Rosen, 1975), suggesting that participants 
might strive to minimize attention costs when comparing the alternatives (Orquin & Mueller 
Loose, 2013). Paper II indicated that participants in the Self-generated condition had 
significantly more revisits between the alternatives. As mental addition requires some effort 
it is possible that participants use eye-movements as a means to ease the working memory 
load. This might be more difficult when the alternatives are spaced further apart. Additional 
evidence comes from results showing that the de-biasing effect of the Self-generated format 
is strongly diminished when participants give their responses to each alternative on separate 
pages (Paper I, Experiment 4). We thus decided to investigate the differences in spacing by 
manipulating the space between the alternatives in the Self-generated format. In Experiment 
2 (Riege et al., 2015), we allocated 61 Amazon MTurk workers to one of two conditions. 
Condition 1 and 2 both used the Self-generated answering format, but differed in the space 
between alternatives (see Figure 1), where the alternatives were spaced further apart in 
Condition 2 than in Condition 1. The results however, revealed no differences (t(59) = -0.56, 
p = .58) between Condition 1 (M = 126.57) and Condition 2 (M = 132.40), indicating that 
this difference in visual display might not lie at the root of the difference (either). 
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Figure 1. The two versions of the Self-generated format: the traditional version is 
displayed in the top panel, and the one with the alternatives spaced further apart is in 
the bottom panel.  
 
 
 
Another visual difference between the two answering formats is that the Scale 
format could draw the attention towards the middle of the scale, possibly anchoring 
estimates on 50% as the middle, and conceivably “neutral” value, thus prompting 
participants to adjust their estimates up or down from 50%. On the other hand, participants 
in the Self-generated would “start” their estimates from zero, relying on the mental 
representation of numbers from low to high (Paper II). We decided to explore this idea in 
Experiment 3 (Riege et al., 2015) by giving 176 MTurk workers five probability tasks using 
either the traditional Scale format (Condition 1), a slider format starting at zero (Condition 
2), or a slider starting at 50 (Condition 3).  
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Table 1 
Probability means, mean number of additive responses (out of five), and standard 
deviations for the three conditions with different scale formats. 
 Scale Slider zero Slider 50 
Mean probabilities 
(SD) 
175.10 169.79 196.01 
(41.45) (48.19) (47.01) 
Number of additive responses  
(SD) 
0.79 0.74 0.39 
(1.29) (1.2) (0.95) 
 
As seen in Table 1, the results showed no difference between the participants’ 
probability sums in Condition 1 and 2, but participants in Condition 3 performed 
significantly worse than participants in Conditions 1 and 2, F(2,175) = 5.27, p = .006, η2 
= .057 (Bonferroni corrected). A similar pattern is observed for the number of additive 
responses (estimates between 90 – 110% were deemed additive), however, there are no 
significant differences between the conditions. It is difficult to establish where participants 
in the Scale format “start out”, but when we make them start out at 50%, as an anchor, the 
probability estimates become even higher.   
Lastly, we have speculated whether the scales themselves are contributing to the 
observed effect. In order to investigate this we re-analyzed the eye-tracking data from Paper 
II using more fine-grained Areas of Interest (AOI). The differences between the AOI’s can 
be observed in Figure 2, which displays the original AOI’s in the top panel, and the new 
AOI’s in the bottom panel. The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
 Table 2 
Mean number of fixations and revisits for the alternatives in two conditions for the three 
sets of AOI’s (SD in parentheses), based on data from Riege, Sulutvedt & Teigen (2014) 
  Self-
generated 
Scale t(25) p* Cohen’s d 
Number of fixations        
     Original AOI’s  128.6 (46.3) 100.1 (33.4)        1.8 .081 0.73 
     Fine-grained AOI’s Text 50.8 (26.3) 25.0 (11.8)        3.2 .003 1.28 
 Scale 9.9 (8.2) 58.0 (21.2)       -7.9 .000 -3.16 
Revisits to alternatives       
     Original AOI’s  43.6 (20.9) 22.0 (12.0) 3.3 .003 1.32 
     Fine-grained AOI’s Text 28.3 (15.2) 11.6 (6.3)        3.7 .001 1.48 
 Scale 5.8 (6.0) 21.6 (11.3)       -4.6 .000 -1.84 
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Figure 2. The original AOI’s are displayed in the top panel. The new AOI’s are 
displayed in the bottom panel. The Scale formats are on the left side, and Self-
generated format on the right. 
 
The results show that participants spend a significant amount of their fixations on 
the scales themselves. Although the overall patterns of results are similar to the original 
results, the fine-grained AOI’s reveal that participants in the Scale condition have more 
fixations and repeated inspections of the scales (the numbers) compared to the alternatives 
(text). In comparison, participants in the self-generated format are only able to focus on the 
alternatives, as they have no scales to look at. This is perhaps not so surprising, however, it 
indicates that scales in the Scale-format might become a “choice within a choice” (Orquin 
& Mueller Loose, 2013), where the participant focuses on the choice options within the 
scale (the numbers), rather than the alternatives (the text) themselves. This may in turn lead 
to less focus on the alternatives in the whole set; encouraging a case-based approach and 
thus as a result inflated probability estimates.  
Answering format and the nonselective superiority bias. In Paper III we 
investigated whether the “debiasing” effect of the Self-generated answering format could 
reduce participants’ nonselective superiority bias. However, this did not affect NSSB-
ratings. Still, the verbal data collected in Paper III suggested that some participants found it 
difficult or unfair to give good job applicants negative ratings. Studies of the nonselective 
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superiority bias often use scales from -4 to 4, where -4 is labelled “Much worse than the 
others”; 0 is labelled “As good as the others”; and 4 is labelled: “Much better than the 
others”. As such, these labels clearly communicate what the respective values mean. Even 
so, the items in the local groups are all superior items compared to a general group, perhaps 
making it difficult for participants to choose negative values for an item. For example, it 
might be difficult to rate a popular vacation destination such as Las Vegas in a negative 
manner, regardless of a judge finding Las Vegas less appealing than Hawaii, rendering the 
illogical evaluation of both vacation destinations as being better than the other. In an 
unpublished follow-up study, we therefore gave 44 participants in the department’s research 
pool two tasks regarding the 2015 Oscar nominations. Half the participants were given the 
traditional NSSB scale ranging from -4 (much less chance than the others), to 4 (much 
higher chance than the others), whereas the other half were given scales ranging from 1 to 9 
(same anchors). The results showed that participants who were given the latter gave on 
average much more balanced ratings (M = 5.35, corresponding to M = 0.35 on the original 
scale) than those given the original scales (M = 1.11) (t(42) = 2.56, p = .014), indicating that 
participants might find it easier to place some of the alternatives on the left side (below the 
midpoint) of the scale when the numbers are positive.  
Communicating beliefs 
Support theory states that the strength of people’s perceived evidence and the 
weighting of this evidence mediate the description of the event and the judgment. In other 
words, support theory claims that the judged probabilities are an expression of people’s 
beliefs which are not subject to normative constraints (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Despite 
the problems with, for example, the non-independence of judgments of support and 
judgments of probabilities (e.g., Pleskac, 2012), there are several other theories suggesting 
that peoples’ probability judgments are expressions of beliefs (Robinson & Hastie, 1985). 
Interestingly, some of our participants expressed that they thought adhering to the 
normative constraints would be “unfair” or “wrong” in the verbal data (Paper III, Exp. 3). 
As mentioned in Paper I, some studies have shown that additivity is also consistently 
violated when participants are allowed to express their judgments in words rather than 
numbers (Teigen, 1988; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Several studies of verbal probabilities 
indicate that translations of positive verbal probability estimates such as “good chance”, 
“likely”, or “probable”, are often translated into numbers above .6 or 60% (Brun & Teigen, 
1988; Reagan, Mosteller, & Youtz, 1989; Theil, 2002). In addition, using such positively 
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valenced words is a way of communicating participants’ beliefs of the event happening 
(Teigen & Brun, 1999). If we consider the case of Bob, who is one of four applicants 
applying for a job, telling him that he has a “good chance” of getting the job will be seen as 
indicative of the speaker being optimistic about Bob’s chances. However, telling Bob that 
he has a 40% chance of getting the job might not be interpreted as an optimistic or positive 
remark, despite a 40% chance rendering, on average, only a 20% chance for the remaining 3 
applicants. Numerical probabilities thus lack the pragmatic information inherent in most 
expressions of verbal probabilities, thereby making them more ambiguous and difficult to 
interpret (Teigen & Brun, 1999, 2000). Also, many participants might not find it natural to 
express themselves using numerical probabilities (Windschitl, 2002). Fuzzy-trace theory 
claims that people often simplify by exchanging exact (verbatim) numbers for simpler gist-
based distinctions, such as “some” or “many” (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991). Taken together, it 
is possible to imagine that the numerical estimates found in subadditivity literature, at least 
for some participants, are “mental translations” of their verbal representations of their 
beliefs, rendering high numerical estimates as a means to communicate judges’ beliefs 
about the event in question. As such, situations enforcing additivity may not get a true 
picture of people’s perceived chances of various events.   
Cognitive mechanisms in probability judgments 
The present work distinguishes between a case-based approach and a class-based 
approach towards referent-dependent judgments, where the former is seen as a main 
contributor to biased responses. Participants’ verbal explanations of violating additivity 
showed that considering the alternatives independently was indeed common, despite being 
presented with a full set of outcomes and instructed to make comparative judgments.  
The present work clearly indicates that asking participants to judge the full set of 
outcomes does not alleviate additivity neglect or the nonselective superiority bias. However, 
there are some studies showing that biases arising from selective processing will be reduced 
when comparative processing is encouraged (e.g., Posavac, Brakus, Cronley, & Jain, 2009). 
For example, asking participants to allocate 100 dollars between all four national parks 
specified in the experiment, resulted in less “overspending” compared to participants who 
were asked to allocate money to one randomly drawn focal park (Posavac et al., 2009). This 
indicates that being reminded of the whole set can reduce inflated donations. However, all 
studies in the present dissertation asked participants to make judgments for a full set of 
outcomes, as have others, without resulting in additive responses. In addition, attempts to 
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induce comparative processing by making participant’s rank-order the alternatives from 
most favorable to least favorable did not affect additivity neglect nor NSSB (Bruchmann et 
al., 2013; Paper III, Experiment 1), adding further evidence to the robustness of both these 
biases.  
It is possible that allocating money is different from allocating probabilities or 
evaluations of superiority, as it might be easier to understand that money is a zero-sum 
entity and thus cannot be spent twice. However, another distinction between our work and 
that of Sanbonmatsu, Posavac and colleagues is the possibility for external information 
search. Although we provide participants with some information in our tasks, there is little 
tangible information or evidence to direct participants in their judgments. Studies on 
selective processing on the other hand often provide some information about the targets. For 
example, Sanbonmatsu et al. (1997, Experiment 2) using similar tasks as those in Paper III 
(Experiments 2 and 3), gave participants eight statements for each of the four job applicants, 
and asked to estimate one randomly chosen job applicant chances of being hired. After the 
judgment was made the information about the job applicants was removed. Participants 
were then given five minutes to recall as many statements as possible for all the job 
applicants, as a measure of the information gathered and used to form the judgment. The 
results showed that participants remembered significantly more statements regarding their 
target applicant than statements about the referent applicants. This indicates that participants 
were focusing more on their target candidate than the referent candidates. This might also to 
an extent explain the findings of Posavac et al. (2009), as participants asked to allocate 
money to only one park may have neglected to read much information about the referent 
parks, thus overestimating the deservingness of the target park.  
Nonetheless, an important question, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, is 
whether there is a qualitative difference between estimating one alternative versus the full 
set. Different cognitive mechanisms might be involved when asked to estimate one 
alternative compared to estimating the full set. On the one hand one can argue that in 
everyday life, people do not evaluate full sets of exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
outcomes or items. More often the judgments encountered in life are related to whether a 
particular outcome will or will not happen, not which outcome will happen (Houghton & 
Kardes, 1998; Sanbonmatsu et al., 1998). In other words, many judgments are considered as 
yes/no questions, instead of a set of possible outcomes, thus subject to case-based reasoning 
based on case-specific information. Studying how people make such judgments is therefore 
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important. Studies investigating participants’ hypothesis generation generally indicate that 
participants stop their generation of hypotheses prematurely (e.g., Gettys & Fisher, 1979), 
and are overconfident in the hypotheses they do generate (e.g., Mehle, Gettys, Manning, 
Baca, & Fisher, 1981). One can thus argue that there is an advantage to giving participants 
the full set of outcomes, as this procedure eliminates any possible confusion regarding the 
partitioning of the probabilities or items included in the judgment (e.g., Gigerenzer, Hertwig, 
van den Broek, Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005). Also, asking participants to judge the full 
set of outcomes or items is a more stringent test of disregard for erroneous logic or 
mathematics, as opposed to asking participants to judge one or a subset of alternatives. 
Displaying the different outcomes in such a manner, gives participants a fair chance of 
making additive estimations. This allows for “full disclosure”, thus avoiding the “hidden 
trap” of unspecified outcomes, strengthening the robustness of the bias.  
 
Implications and potential future directions of the present work 
Assessing the probabilities of future events is both an important and common task. 
Every time we decide to add to or spend our savings, play the lottery, cast our vote at an 
election, or choose which restaurant to eat, we are making a forecast about how the future 
will proceed, often as a means to affect our odds of a favorable outcome. Accordingly, 
considerable research efforts have gone into understanding how people make such 
judgments and how these judgments can be improved. The present research has several 
implications for future research in this field.  
Firstly, the present work demonstrates that contrary to implicit and explicit 
conventions within the field, people still give non-additive responses in situations where the 
complete set of outcomes is presented on the same page. Thus, the assumption that people 
will correct themselves in contexts containing such “extensional cues” is not necessarily the 
case. Studies investigating subjective probability judgments or asking people for predictions 
of uncertain events should thus take care when deciding how to ask their questions. People 
will have trouble staying within limits and depending on the information the researcher 
wants, one can either explicitly remind participants that they have to stay within limits (e.g., 
De Bruin, Manski, Topa, & van der Klaauw, 2011), or accept estimates that add to more 
than 100%. The downside of the former is that when asking participants to stay within 
limits, their answers might not reflect their true beliefs. Further, some answers may simply 
adhere to the requirement of coherence by simply giving ignorance prior responses (e.g., 
25% - 25% - 25% - 25%), thus failing to distinguish between the alternative outcomes. This 
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can be circumvented using the latter strategy, and perhaps scaling the judgments down for 
analysis if coherence is an important concern. However, one cannot be sure that people’s 
estimates are relative to all the outcomes in the set, but rather a set of absolute judgments 
for some participants, and for others a set of comparative judgments.      
 The effect of answering format also has implications for how researchers design 
their studies. Rating scales and self-generated studies are often used interchangeably, but 
might affect people’s answers, particularly in the case of probability judgments. The finding 
that Self-generated answers led to lower probability estimates and more coherent responses 
indicates that this format might be preferable to rating scales when coherence is important. 
The present work cannot determine if Self-generated estimates are consistently more 
coherent or consistently lower than responses on a rating scale in other contexts, but adds to 
the growing literature of how contexts affect people’s probability judgments and responses 
to questionnaires in general (Schwarz, 1999). Further, the finding that the self-generated 
format facilitates more comparative judgments (Paper II) shows that in situations where 
comparisons between alternatives are important, rating scales might interrupt comparisons, 
thus resulting in absolute or independent judgments for each alternative, despite explicit 
instructions to make comparative judgments (Paper III). 
 The finding of the role of numeracy in Paper I have implications for research on 
numeracy. The role of numeracy in heuristics and biases tasks has been mixed. The present 
results indicate that numeracy is indeed related to additivity neglect, but perhaps more 
importantly, reminding participants that mathematical rules might apply led to more 
coherent responses, particularly for those with higher numeracy. Perhaps some of the 
confusing findings in the numeracy literature are based on participants not realizing that 
they could make use of their math skills. Consequently, using measures to remind people 
might make the role of numeracy clearer. On the other hand, some people have a difficult 
relationship with math, and may not only receive no benefit from the reminder, but possibly 
perform worse as a consequence. 
An interesting implication of numeracy research is the possibility of serving as an 
argument for all teenagers who feel that learning math is irrelevant, often arguing that “they 
will never need this (math) in real life”. The present research shows that having the ability 
to reason with numbers and mathematical concepts, and the ability to realize when these 
skills can be used, seems to aid coherence in probabilistic predictions of future events.  
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Lastly, the findings in Paper III have several implications for future research on 
referent-dependent judgments. Paper III indicated that there might be similar underlying 
mechanisms for errors in referent-dependent judgments. Future research should expand on 
this by for example including self-other judgments (better than average effect), preferably 
with the aim of developing an overarching theoretical framework for errors in referent-
dependent judgment. Further, the failure to understand both “rules” and complementarity of 
referent-dependent judgments should be investigated. For example, several studies have 
found subadditivity in judgments of frequency (Bearden & Wallsten, 2004; Mulford & 
Dawes, 1999; Tversky & Koehler, 1994), using a between- subjects design. Similarly, a 
study investigating allocations of market shares, also found that participants’ estimates of 
percentage market shares for a set of exhaustive companies added to, on average, 192% 
(Houghton & Kardes, 1998). Both frequencies and market shares seem intuitively easier to 
understand than probabilities, though people seem to struggle with staying within the limits 
in such cases as well. Investigating the boundary conditions of people’s understanding of 
complementarity should be investigated using within-subjects judgments, asking people to 
allocate various entities, such as money, expected frequency of occurrence for various 
events, as well as probability judgments and superiority ratings. As people make such 
judgments on a daily basis it is essential to collate the information already available, as well 
as establishing an overall framework and boundary conditions for referent-dependent 
judgments.   
 
Conclusions  
In three papers we have explored determinants and cognitive underpinnings of 
additivity neglect. We found that individual differences in numeracy predict additive 
responses, where numeracy is inversely related to additivity neglect in single outcome 
events. In addition, inducing a mathematical mindset, reminding participants that 
mathematical rules may apply, leads to more additive responses. However, the 
mathematical mindset does not aid responses to disjunctive outcome events, nor does 
numeracy predict normative responses to such tasks. We also found that different answering 
formats affect additivity neglect, where writing the probabilities in empty slots next to the 
alternatives (Self-generated format) lead to more additive responses than circling numbers 
on a scale (Scale format). The Self-generated format seems to encourage a more 
comparative (or class-based) processing thus leading to more additive responses, where the 
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Scale format hiders normative responses by making comparisons between the alternatives 
harder to perform, as indicated by participants eye-movements whilst making their 
judgments. The present work also compared additivity neglect to another bias in referent-
dependent judgments, namely the nonselective superiority bias (NSSB). The results show 
that the same participants often display both biases. In addition, verbal reports demonstrated 
that people fail to consider normative constraints due to considering alternatives one-by-one 
(case-based), or because the constraints would lead to judgments not representing their true 
beliefs. 
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